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Although some have called into question the causal eﬀect that job contacts
have on employment outcomes, like job ﬁnding (Mouw, 2003, 2006), a
large and growing body of research indicates that having a job contact
both increases the odds of ﬁnding work and has beneﬁcial eﬀects on wages
and occupational prestige as well (Fernandez, Castillo, & Moore, 2000;
Fernandez & Galparin, 2014; Fernandez & Weinberg, 1997; Granovetter,
1974/1995; Lin, Ensel, & Vaughn, 1981; Lin, Lee, & Ao, 2014; Petersen,
Saporta, & Seidel, 2000). It seems clear that during the job-matching pro-
cess, contacts give referrals a distinct advantage over nonreferrals.
But potential job contacts do not always help, even when they are
well positioned to do so. Marin (2012), for instance, reports that when
the entry-level, white-collar workers she interviewed had information
about job openings and knowledge of at least one appropriate job-seek-
ing candidate with whom they might share this information, they shared
less than one third of the time. Smith (2005, 2007), too, reports that the
young, low-income Black men and women she interviewed often for-
sook the job seekers in their networks, even as these job seekers
struggled with persistent joblessness (see also Marin, 2013; Newman,
1999; Paul, 2012; Royster, 2003; S. S. Smith, 2010; Trimble-O’Connor,
2013). As these cases illustrate, access to social capital did not guarantee
its mobilization (Lin, 2001); observed patterns of assistance privileged
some job seekers over others and highlighted some of the conditions
under which social capital mobilization was likely to occur.
And yet, despite the central role job contacts play in helping to deter-
mine the winners and losers of the status attainment competition, we
still know relatively little about how potential job contacts make deci-
sions about whom to help, when to help, how best to help, or whether to
help at all. This decades-old neglect has resulted for understandable
reasons. Granovetter’s (1973, 1983, 1974/1995) counterintuitive empir-
ical ﬁnding about the ‘‘strength of weak ties,’’ extended and reﬁned by
Burt (1992), contributed signiﬁcantly to the pathbreaking theoretical
insight that network structures play an important role in the eﬃcient
ﬂow of ‘‘market stuﬀ.’’ The network structuralist approach—as encap-
sulated in the networks-as-pipes metaphor—became the dominant lens
through which to understand the role networks play during the status
attainment process. But it did so in part by discounting the importance
of individuals’ motivations and intentions, as these appeared to have
little explanatory power. In arguing for ‘‘the primacy of structure over
motivation,’’ for instance, Granovetter (1974/1995, p. 54) reasoned that
although close friends and relatives have greater motivations to help
their job-seeking relations than do those to whom we are weakly tied,
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weak ties tend to be strategically better located in social structure to do
so. Burt makes a diﬀerent argument. He contends that players may
indeed be pushed to engage by motivations rooted in culture and
social psychology, but they are also pulled into engagement by the
opportunities aﬀorded to them by network structure. Indeed, Burt
argues that the motivation to engage in entrepreneurial activities and
the opportunities to do so are much the same, because individuals who
are motivated to participate in entrepreneurial activities will conﬁgure
their networks to produce such opportunities, and those who, through
no eﬀort of their own, happen to be embedded in networks rich in such
opportunities will be motivated to engage because that is the way of life
among those so embedded. With this structuralist-rooted proposition,
Burt is able to ‘‘leap over the motivation issue’’ altogether (p. 35). But in
so doing, he also bypasses of the unspoken rules and related cultural
meanings that inform individuals’ patterns of job-matching help (see C.
Smith, 2010, for a thoughtful critique the network structuralist
approach to these and similar questions).
Recent attention to the job-matching process from the perspective of
the job contact, however, has led some researchers to question the
assumptions underlying the network structuralist approach. The
switch from an egocentric (job seeker) to an altercentric (job contact)
focus has foregrounded questions about motivations and intentions, the
stuﬀ of culture and social psychology, yet again. For instance, to better
understand why Black poor job seekers were relatively infrequently
matched to jobs by personal contacts, with implications for better
understanding persistent joblessness among the Black poor, Smith
(2005, 2007) investigated how potential job contacts engaged the process
(see also Newman, 1999; Menjivar, 2000; Trimble-O’Connor, 2013).
Her research revealed that potential job contacts were often not more
motivated to help close friends and family members than to help
acquaintances. Despite strong bonds of aﬀection, reputational concerns
led job contacts to assess the risks associated with helping to be too
high. In Smith’s work, the motivation that Granovetter (1974/1995)
assumes to exist among strong ties was often not in evidence. Marin
(2012, 2013) conducted in-depth interviews with entry-level white-collar
workers to understand how contacts’ network structure and compos-
ition informed their decisions to intervene in the process. Her analysis
revealed that more diverse networks did produce greater opportunities
to engage, as Burt (1992) would have predicted, but job contacts
embedded in such networks were no more likely to share job informa-
tion than were those embedded in less diverse networks; apparently,
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opportunities to engage and the motivation to do so are not one and the
same. While these studies are far from the ﬁrst to empirically highlight
the shortcomings of the network structuralist approach (see, for
instance, Podolny, 1993, 1994, 2001), they are among the ﬁrst to do
so in the job-matching realm. As such, they represent important contri-
butions to this area of research.
Despite the promise that such studies hold in oﬀering a new perspec-
tive on network-based allocation processes, however, they have
struggled to oﬀer clear articulations of the underlying cultural logics
that inform the decisions potential contacts make about making refer-
rals (for notable exceptions, see Newman, 1999; Menjivar, 2000; Smith,
2005, 2007). According to Enﬁeld (2000), cultural logics are ‘‘systems of
assumptions and counter-assumptions,’’ mutually reinforcing, that are
built on cultural accounts about how the world works and about what is
generally known to be true. These shared assumptions, developed,
maintained, and altered in interaction with others in one’s social
milieu—including friends, relatives, acquaintances, and the institutions
within which they are embedded—allow for group members to come to
similar conclusions about others’ motives and intentions. Indeed,
Enﬁeld (2000) notes,
Culture emerges from the irresistible tendency for individuals to build
convention and to establish stereotypes and other kinds of precedents,
so as to form personal libraries of models and scenarios which may serve
as reference material in inferring and attributing motivations behind peo-
ple’s actions, and behind other mysterious phenomena. (p. 37)
In so doing, culture and the logics that give them structure also motivate
individuals’ actions, shaping whether, why, and how they engage with
others. Importantly, because cultural logics are developed and main-
tained within speciﬁc cultural contexts, any one event or issue can be
understood through a diﬀerent set of assumptions, the product of dis-
tinct cultural contexts, and thus one event or issue can also produce
diﬀerent behavioral responses.
It is this understanding of the job-matching process—the mutually
reinforcing set of assumptions that inform potential job contacts’ pat-
terns of job-matching assistance—that continues to go unexamined in
the literature. For instance, Paul (2012) enumerates the various factors
associated with Filipino migrant workers’ willingness to help compat-
riots through the migratory and job-ﬁnding process. Contingencies
included, among other factors, results of migrants’ past eﬀorts to
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help, prospective migrants’ perceived commitment to migrating, and tie
strength, both between prior and prospective migrants and between
prior migrants and their employers. However, Paul’s ﬁndings, while
insightful to the extent that they conﬁrm prior work about the condi-
tions that facilitate social capital mobilization (see Menjivar, 2000;
Smith, 2005, 2007), are of limited utility for making sense of her
migrants’ decisions because she neglects to explain why these factors
mattered, and how they came to matter, to the migrants she interviewed.
We learn precious little about the actual accounts, or representations of
how the world works, that migrants had drawn from such that privile-
ging some prospective migrants over others made sense. Nor are we
made privy to the experiences migrants had that gave form and content
to these accounts. Without migrants’ accounts, Paul misses an
opportunity to eﬀectively link a set of clearly speciﬁed cultural logics
with migrants’ actions toward compatriots, and so she struggles to
oﬀer a solid framework about the conditions under which Filipino
migrants help.
We gain greater insight into the minds of Marin’s Canadian entry-
level, white-collar workers. Marin (2012) reports that most opportu-
nities they had to share information were left to wither. But when
they helped, ﬁt was often implicated. Job contacts were more likely to
help job seekers who worked in the same industry because they were
presumed to be more suitable candidates. They were also more likely to
help close friends and relatives than acquaintances because they were
more comfortable oﬀering unsolicited job information and advice to
those with whom they were closely tied. Because of closeness, job con-
tacts were also better able to assess job seekers’ ﬁt with the job. These
are very important ﬁndings, as they oﬀer compelling reasons, above and
beyond what the current body of research indicates, for why jobholders
might be more inclined to help strong over weak ties. Marin (2012,
2013) could have gone deeper, however, to uncover the logics operating
among her entry-level workers. For instance, we never learn how job-
holders conceptualized ﬁt, how potential job candidates evaluated job
seekers for ﬁt, and why ﬁt came to be an important criterion for sorting
among her job contacts? Responses to these questions would help give
shape to the cultural logics that inform jobholders’ behaviors and in the
process would better explain why her entry-level workers so infrequently
oﬀered job-matching help even under what appeared to be the best
circumstances.
Other studies oﬀer greater insight along these lines. Smith (2005,
2007) oﬀered a multilevel conceptual framework to understand social
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capital mobilization among the Black poor, taking into consideration
properties of the individuals, dyads, and communities of residence. And
although she, too, enumerates factors, she linked each factor of signiﬁ-
cance to a coherent logic underlying the provision of job-matching
assistance—defensive individualism. Smith contends that within the
context of urban, Black poverty, friends, relatives, acquaintances, and
institutions in the social milieu blame the poor and jobless for their
persistent joblessness, deploying discourses of joblessness that privileges
individuals’ moral shortcomings and stressing personal responsibility
and self-suﬃciency as a panacea. In this context of pervasive distrust,
potential job contacts were reluctant to help, and job seekers, cognizant
of how they were viewed and of how their joblessness was understood,
also embraced individualism and self-reliant approaches to job search as
their own distrust toward themselves and intermediaries grew. The cul-
tural logic of defensive individualism brought into sharp relief why the
provision of job-matching assistance among and between this commu-
nity of Black poor residents was lacking. Hamm and McDonald’s
(2015) analysis of the General Social Survey and Holbrow’s (2015) ana-
lysis of data from Japan provide further support for Smith’s (2005,
2007) central argument.
Outside of the context of urban, Black poverty, and persistent job-
lessness, however, defensive individualism as a cultural logic likely
makes little sense. Indeed, Marin (2012) notes that many of the issues
highlighted by Smith’s respondents were irrelevant to her entry-level,
white-collar workers and still, they too, more often than not decided
against helping. This makes sense as logics are themselves ‘‘constructed
by, and learned from within, speciﬁc cultural contexts’’ (Enﬁeld, 2000,
p. 40). But we know little about the logics operating in other cultural
contexts that shape motivations for actions around the provision of job-
matching assistance. Marin’s abbreviated discussion of ﬁt as an import-
ant criteria for assistance among white-collar workers, for instance, is
promising, especially given the recent work of Ofer Sharone (2013), who
notes the importance of ﬁt discourses for job ﬁnding among middle-
class job seekers in San Francisco. But much more needs to be done to
develop this line of inquiry. We attempt to do so here.
The Case Study
Between the spring of 2008 and the fall of 2009, in-depth, semistructured
interviews were conducted with a nonrandom sample of 146 custodian,
food service, and administrative staﬀ workers at one large, public sector
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employer in the state of California, which we will call California Public
Sector Employer (CPSE).1 CPSE has a racially and ethnically diverse
permanent and contingent workforce of about 9,000. At its worksite are
approximately 1,000 facilities operations and maintenance workers (cus-
todians), 250 food service workers, and over 2,700 administrative or
clerical and related support staﬀ (admin), among other occupational
categories. For participation in this study, jobholders were primarily
recruited through two related strategies. Over one dozen unit super-
visors and managers were asked permission to describe the study to
jobholders during staﬀ meetings and to recruit those who expressed
interest in participating. This recruitment strategy yielded approxi-
mately two thirds of the interviews conducted. To maximize range
and to ensure the recruitment of a diverse subset of workers (Weiss,
1994), we asked each respondent to help recruit up to three additional
CPSE custodians, food service workers, and administrative staﬀ from
their networks who ﬁt the study criteria.2 This approach yielded one
third of study participants. See Table 1 for sample characteristics.
Between 15% and 18% of CPSE’s workforce has been contingent in
recent years, but all of the jobholders interviewed for this study were
‘‘permanent.’’ At CPSE, permanent and contingent workers are often
Table 1. Characteristics of Sample Respondents (N¼ 146).
Frequency or mean Range
Gender: % female 53 —
Race or ethnicity (%)
Asian 9 —
Black or African American 42 —
Latino 26 —
White 13 —
Multiracial 9 —
Mean age (years) 42.5 18–68
Occupation (%)
Custodians or maintenance 33 —
Food service 35 —
Administrative support 27 —
Mean job tenure (years) 9.7 .10–37
Mean earnings in prior month $2,535 $140–$7500
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employed in the same occupational categories, but workers with per-
manent status are signiﬁcantly advantaged over their contingent coun-
terparts (Kalleberg, 2011; Kalleberg, Reskin, & Hudson, 2000). The
decision to focus recruitment on permanent workers was deliberate.
Previous research indicates that job contacts’ decisions to make referrals
are in part informed by their own tenuous positions in the labor market
(Smith, 2005, 2007). By interviewing respondents who are objectively
under no threat of job loss at CPSE if a match they facilitate goes sour
(although they may have been under such threat with previous employ-
ers about which we learn), we can look past this otherwise important
constraint to providing job-ﬁnding assistance to identify the other
factors that shape jobholders’ decisions to help.
Previous research has also noted the role that organizations play in
constraining or expanding opportunities for network-based recruitment
(Waldinger & Lichter, 2003). At CPSE, workers are given ample oppor-
tunity to intervene during the hiring process, for permanent and con-
tingent hires, if they so choose. Once a unit has been given permission to
hire, the manager or supervisor of the unit ﬁrst posts the position intern-
ally. They do so because current employees have ﬁrst rights to ﬁll vacant
positions, and so jobholders know to review these announcements if
they wish to transfer to another department within CPSE or if they
want to get a heads-up for their job-seeking relations on openings
that might become available to the public. Importantly, every worker
interviewed for this study reported that they knew when CPSE was
hiring, and for what positions, speciﬁcally because of the biweekly
announcements that are posted in workers’ common areas (as was the
case for custodians and food service workers) or e-mailed directly to
workers (as was typical for administrative staﬀ). Further, no worker in
this study reported that supervisors or managers approached them in
particular to encourage network-based recruitment. Because of eﬀorts
to disseminate information about job vacancies widely and equitably,
we are reasonably conﬁdent that few CPSE jobholders were advantaged
over others in receiving timely information about new job opportunities
(Burt, 1992).
If the posted position is not ﬁlled internally, staﬀ at the Central
Personnel Oﬃce publicize it by posting its details on online job sites,
such as monster.com and IMDiversity.com, as well as CPSE’s own
website. The vacancy remains open for a speciﬁed period of time, usu-
ally 2 weeks, after which no applications are accepted. Applicants
submit their dossier of materials for CPSE positions online via
CPSE’s own online application system. To aid their job-seeking contacts
8 Work and Occupations 0(0)
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through this part of the process, jobholders can inform them that appli-
cations are being accepted and point them to the online application
system. Roughly 80% of jobholders in this sample recently helped some-
one to ﬁnd work at CPSE and 9 in 10 did so at least in part by oﬀering
this basic level of assistance. Jobholders might take it a step further and
oﬀer strategic advice—providing them with the job number for the pos-
ition or positions of interest, informing them about which hard and soft
skills are being sought for the positions in question, and explaining how
they might best showcase their skills and talents on their re´sume´s.
Roughly 37% of jobholders did so. Jobholders can also give applicants
permission to list them as a reference, which 22% of jobholders oﬀered.
Many of these approaches have been found to advantage referrals
over nonreferrals during the hiring process (Fernandez et al., 2000;
Fernandez & Weinberg, 1997).
Once the application deadline has passed, staﬀ members at the
Central Personnel Oﬃce facilitate the review process by collating appli-
cations and sending them to relevant departments. Anticipating this,
jobholders can intervene again by approaching their managers or
supervisors to advocate for their referrals, typically by asking them to
‘‘pull the application’’ for closer review. Fifty-one percent of jobholders
who helped talked to hiring personnel on behalf of their job-seeking
relation. After the department receives relevant applications, the man-
ager or supervisor convenes a panel for review. Each panel consists of
three or four members—the department manager or supervisor and two
or three workers whose jobs are directly related to the position being
ﬁlled. Together, the panelists identify from the full stack of applications
a short list of candidates for interviews. The interview can take place by
phone, in person with the manager or supervisor, or in person with the
full panel. If referrals are called for an interview, jobholders can oﬀer
more strategic advice by informing candidates about the types of ques-
tions they can expect to be asked and educating them about the best
answers to provide. After interviews are complete, a hiring decision is
made. Although the ﬁnal decision lies with the manager or supervisor,
the workers on the panel are considered to be important advisors in the
process.3
Data Coding and Analysis
To determine how jobholders made decisions about making referrals,
jobholders were asked a set of questions about the climate of helping in
their communities and on the job; the risks, costs, and beneﬁts that they
Smith and Young 9
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imagined were associated with providing job-matching help; and the
extent and nature of job-matching experiences they actually had, includ-
ing their most recent experiences as well as experiences in the distant
past that stand out to them as particularly problematic and particularly
rewarding. With the data gathered, a general inductive approach to
coding and analysis was taken, beginning the coding process with cate-
gories that jobholders had themselves identiﬁed as important and using
the terms speciﬁc to their cultural contexts (Coﬀey & Atkinson, 1996;
Miles & Huberman, 1994; Strauss, 1987; Strauss & Corbin, 1990). After
the ﬁrst author read and coded each jobholders’ responses to these
questions, three dominant themes and related categories emerged as
central. From a second read, the ﬁrst author conﬁrmed each set of
themes and categories and then sought to unpack the layered meanings
associated with each. Through a third reading of the ﬁles, the ﬁrst
author both sought to conﬁrm these meanings and then to link them
to generate broader conceptual frames. Three distinct logics emerged
from this process.
With these three logics in mind, the ﬁrst and second authors coded
each respondent separately and then met to discuss the results of our
respective assignments. On our ﬁrst round, we achieved agreement on
79% of cases. For 10% of cases, there was no overlap in our codes. In
12% of cases, disagreement was only partial in that one coded job-
holders in terms of one distinct logic (say need) and the other chose
multiple logics, including one that the ﬁrst coder had chosen (say need
and ﬁt). We then discussed cases on which we disagreed, drawing from
the data to explain our rationale. After discussion, we came to agree-
ment on 100% of these codes.4 Given this, we feel reasonably conﬁdent
in the three logics of job-matching assistance uncovered in the data and
believe that this marks an important advance in ways of thinking about
network-based job allocation processes.
Three Logics
As cultural logics of assistance, defensive individualism, particularism,
and matchmaking each reﬂects a diﬀerent set of assumptions about
whether, when, how, and for whom those in possession of information
and inﬂuence should intervene in the job-matching process. Logics diﬀer
along three interrelated dimensions. First, each logic is associated with a
distinct primary criterion used to decide whether to help and how best
to do so, based primarily on their understanding of what motivates
individuals to work hard. Second, logics diﬀer by the degree of risk of
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job-matching failure that jobholders associate with engaging in the pro-
cess as personal intermediaries. Third, logics are distinguished by the
nature of the screening practices that jobholders adopt to determine
whether job seekers have met their criterion for help. In Table 2, we
outline these diﬀerences, and later we elaborate on each logic in turn.5
Defensive Individualism
Defensive individualism, embraced by 28% of jobholders, combines
want as the primary criterion for support, an elevated sense of risk of
job-matching failure, and inorganic screening practices to determine
whether and to what extent job seekers have met the primary criterion
to receive help. As shown in Table 3, defensive individualists were dis-
proportionately Black and food service workers. Although 43% of
respondents in this CPSE sample were Black, 68% of defensive indi-
vidualists were, and while 38% of respondents in the sample were food
service workers, 56% of defensive individualists were. Defensive indi-
vidualists were generally wary about actively engaging the job-matching
process as intermediaries. Consistent with Smith’s defensive individual-
ists (2005, 2007), they anticipated that their eﬀorts would likely fail or be
wasted, because most job seekers they knew lacked a strong commit-
ment to work. The perceived inevitability of failure was deep and per-
vasive for three reasons. First, defensive individualists were embedded
in networks and communities that had relatively weak attachments to
the labor market but strong ties to the welfare and criminal justice sys-
tems. Second, prior eﬀorts to help job seekers to ﬁnd work often failed
because of the perception that job seekers were disengaged from the
process. Combined, these ﬁrst two factors caused jobholders to attribute
job-matching failures to job seekers’ half-hearted ﬁdelity to work.
Third, that the screening practices jobholders developed to sort risky
from safe job seekers were too often ineﬀective only cemented further
jobholders’ sense of inevitable failure. Thus, they responded to requests
for job-matching help by stressing job seekers’ need to take personal
Table 2. Dimensions of Cultural Logics.
Defensive individualism Particularism Matchmaking
Primary criterion Want Need Fit
Level of perceived risk High Low-moderate Moderate
Screening practices Inorganic Organic Combination
Smith and Young 11
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responsibility and to become self-suﬃcient, and so they encouraged
many job seekers, subtly and not so subtly, to ﬁnd work on their own.
Want comes from within. Defensive individualists were convinced that job-
matching success largely turned on whether job seekers really wanted to
work. Consequently, this was the most important factor that job holders
considered when determining whether job seekers were worthy of job-
matching support. George Biggs, a fairly typical defensive individualist,
was a 53-year-old married father of ﬁve and at the time of his interview
had been employed at CPSE for 7 years. Although a suburban resident,
he returned weekly to the troubled neighborhood of his youth to visit
old neighbors, and when he did, job seekers approached him often with
requests for job-matching help. But George describes meeting these
requests with skepticism. Most, he sensed, were not serious about want-
ing to work. According to George,
Yeah, because all the cats I know are jivers, see? Hustlers and BSers.
If you don’t really listen, you won’t hear that they’re lying to you.
Table 3. Logics by Respondents’ Demographic Characteristics.
Defensive
individualists Particularists Matchmakers
Multiple
logics
Mean/median age 43/48 42/42 41/40 43/41
% Female (53.8%) 51.2 43.8 64.2 63.6
Ethnoracial categories
Asians (9.1%) 2.5 18.8 9.6 9.1
African Americans (42.7%) 67.5 9.4 44.2 45.5
Latinos (25.2%) 15.0 71.9 3.8 36.4
Whites (13.3%) 2.5 0 28.8 0
Mixed race (9.8%) 12.5 0 13.5 9.1
Occupations
Custodians (33.6%) 39.0 65.6 9.3 27.3
Administrative staff (28.1%) 4.9 3.1 64.8 27.3
Food service
workers (38.4%)
56.1 31.3 25.9 45.5
Job tenure (in years) 8.6 10.5 9.4 9.7
Monthly income ($) 2,234 2,217 3,016 2,252
College degree or greater (%) 31.7 13.7 57.4 30.0
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It’s like someone begging on the corner. You give them some money, they
go buy a beer. ‘‘I thought you was hungry?’’ ‘‘Well I’m hungry for alco-
hol. I didn’t lie.’’ I say it’s like that, man.
George’s analog to beggars on the corner provides an imagery that
magniﬁes the sense of cynicism he feels whenever he engages with job
seekers about the search process. And so with each approach, he con-
sidered the following,
How sincere are you about working—that’s the ﬁrst thing I look at.
Do you really want to work? Not just say, ‘‘I need a job,’’ but how sincere
are you to come here every day and be here at a certain time, and are
you going to do more than they ask you to do to prove that you really
want a job.
Want came from within. Defensive individualists understood it to be a
core aspect of job seekers’ personalities, an essential part of who they
were. As such, it represented a deep-rooted and steadfast source of job
seekers’ motivation to work and would reliably signal low risk of job-
matching failure. To underline this point, defensive individualists often
contrasted want with need, as they understood these to be diﬀerent and
used them in diﬀerent ways. Among defensive individualists, want
trumped need because while the former originated from and resided
within, the latter had external roots. George explained narratively:
Myself, I’ve got about two people up here that didn’t make it. They
wasn’t really about working; they were just talking. I used to tell them,
‘‘Man, how bad you really need a job?’’ I mean, do you really want a job?
Not just ‘‘I need a job.’’ Everybody say that, but from the heart . . .From
the heart, yeah. You got to want a job from the heart, not because your
mama wants you to get a job or your girlfriend want you to get a job. You
got to want the job, man.
Notable as well is the way in which these jobholders associated job
seekers’ trustworthiness with wanting, not needing, to work.
This distinction was important. Defensive individualists perceived
job seekers’ needs as ephemeral and so unlikely to motivate job seekers
to keep working after employment was secured. After all, they reasoned,
what someone lacks today could be (and often was) achieved in any
number of ways tomorrow. Consequently, if job seekers’ commitment
to work was solely or primarily contingent on their externally rooted
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needs, then once those needs were met, their motivation to work would
fade as well. Many defensive individualists made note of the ubiquitous
newly hired worker who expended great eﬀort on the job until he
received his ﬁrst paycheck, at which point he promptly disappeared.
With these experiences in mind, defensive individualists had little inter-
est in helping those who attributed their search for work to the need to
do so. When job seekers’ motivations were internally rooted, however,
defensive individualists felt they could be trusted to excel in their eﬀorts
to ﬁnd work and to keep it, and so jobholders’ eﬀorts would not be
in vain.
Helping: A risky endeavor. How did want become such a signiﬁcant criter-
ion for providing job-matching support? First, these jobholders lived in,
or were raised in, neighborhoods where they perceived most other resi-
dents to be only weakly attached to the labor market. When asked what
kinds of jobs people in her community held, for instance, 30-year-old
senior cook, Loreen Reynolds, responded, ‘‘Well, where I live at cur-
rently they don’t too much work. Not too many of them are
working . . . Most of the women that live on my block, they’re probably
on AFDC.’’ Similarly, 23-year-old Renita Wilson, a food service worker
pregnant with her ﬁrst child, explained that while a number of residents
of her apartment building had jobs, most others from her neighborhood
did not. ‘‘Most of them, I’ve noticed that they don’t work at all,’’ she
stated. And when asked how most of the people in his community found
jobs, David Jackson, a 34-year-old custodian with 4 years on the job
simply replied, ‘‘How? You’ve got to remember: Most of the people in
my community don’t work.’’ Importantly, the weak labor force attach-
ments of community residents included defensive individualists’ own
close, personal ties. Relative to the personal networks of particularists
and matchmakers, a lower percentage of defensive individualists’ were
employed (68% compared with 83% and 81%, respectively) and a sub-
stantially higher percentage had received public assistance (31% com-
pared with 15% and 16%, respectively).6
But the objective fact of job seekers’ relatively weak labor market
attachments would not necessarily have led defensive individualists to
associate want and risk if it were not for the following: Too often their
past eﬀorts to match friends, relatives, and acquaintances to job oppor-
tunities failed because of job seekers’ perceived disengagement from the
matching process or because of their poor performance on the job once
hired. Although many job seekers asked for help ﬁnding work, 60% of
defensive individualists complained that these job seekers often failed to
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follow through on the information they provided or take advantage of
inﬂuence they wielded in response to job seekers’ requests. Among par-
ticularists and matchmakers, just 6% and 11% did so, respectively (see
Table 4). A higher percentage of defensive individualists also described
having been burned in the past by job seekers who got jobs due in part
to their eﬀorts only to behave unprofessionally, behaviors that often led
to job seekers’ dismissal and to jobholders’ somewhat tarnished repu-
tations. Forty-nine percent of defensive individualists shared such
experiences, but only 28% of particularists and 25% of matchmakers
did. In all, while 31% of particularists and 28% of matchmakers com-
plained that job seekers either failed to follow through or behaved
unprofessionally once hired, 74% of defensive individualists did. Just
as striking, 3% of particularists and 8% of matchmakers experienced
both issues, but among defensive individualists, 36% did.
In an ironic turn, defensive individualists interpreted job seekers’
weak labor force participation and strong welfare and criminal justice
ties not as evidence that these job seekers had been socially and eco-
nomically dislocated and marginalized (Kasarda, 1995; Kirschenman &
Neckerman, 1991; Shih, 2002; Waldinger & Lichter, 2003; Wilson, 1987,
1996), often with multiple barriers to employment (Loprest &
Zedlewski, 1999), but instead that, lacking intrinsic motivation, they
had chosen alternative and presumably easy sources of income to
make ends meet. Their experiences of job-matching failure contributed
to such accounts. These alternatives to work, defensive individualists
argued, made work in the formal economy one of many options from
which to choose and brought into sharp relief the intrinsic motivation
required to be good workers in the formal wage economy. From job-
holders’ perspective, then, the ability that job seekers had to choose, and
how choice magniﬁed the importance of intrinsic motivation, was at the
Table 4. Percentage of Jobholders With Prior Negative Job-Matching
Experiences by Logics of Assistance (N¼ 146).
Defensive
individualists Particularists Matchmakers
Multiple
logics
Jobseekers do not
follow through/up
60 6 11 36
Burned in the past 47 28 25 27
Experienced at least one 74 31 28 34
Experienced both 36 3 7 27
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core of their heightened risk of job-matching failure. Thus, in a context
where job seekers were perceived to have various options available to
them to make ends meet, including many options outside of the formal
economy, job seekers’ want, a measure of their commitment to work,
was a key ingredient for job-matching success; in its absence, the process
would inevitably prove to be too risky to provide support, most notably
proactive support.
The ironies of the waiting game. Determining which job seekers really
wanted to work was much easier said than done. Defensive individual-
ists commonly complained that many job seekers who insisted that they
wanted to work eventually behaved in ways that betrayed their asser-
tions, and so to distinguish the sincere from the insincere, the doers from
the talkers, defensive individualists adopted a multistep screening pro-
cess. They were particularly attuned to how eﬀortful, intensely, and
persistently job seekers engaged the search process. This information
served as a proxy for how committed job seekers were to work in the
formal economy.
Because lack-of-follow-through was such a common experience,
defensive individualists responded to initial requests for help with pas-
sive assistance—they limited the aid they provided to conﬁrmation that
CPSE was hiring and encouraged job seekers to visit the website for
more information. And then they waited. Waiting was essential because
it gave defensive individualists time to gather additional information
signaling the extent and nature of job seekers’ commitment to work
(Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997). In particular, they would note whether job
seekers followed up on the information they provided, how quickly they
did so, and what additional eﬀorts they made on their own to move the
process forward. Those who truly wanted to work, defensive individu-
alists reasoned, pursued job opportunities aggressively and, some might
say, shamelessly. When presented with job leads, they would, at the very
least, show initiative and follow-up. But most motivated job seekers
would also persistently inquire about the status of their applications
and pressure jobholders to advocate on their behalf; they were relentless
in their pursuit of work and so were not above harassing intermediaries
for greater intervention. As 49-year-old custodian, Carl Bartlett,
explained,
If they ask me one time I’ll think about it. But if they keep coming back
and bugging me and bugging me about it—did you do it, did you do it?
I say—okay, then I’ll recommend. I’ll go talk to my boss. ‘‘Hey, the man
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is harassing me every day. Can I give him your number? Let them harass
you for a little while.’’ That means they really want it. Yeah. And I let my
boss know—yeah, he really wants it, boss.
Similarly, Julia Simon, a 50-year-old food service worker with 10 years
at CPSE, explained, ‘‘Because if they’re ready, they’re going to con-
stantly ask me, ‘When the job is going to call? When they’re going to
call? When you talk to your supervisor?’’’ These were the signals job-
holders sought to conﬁrm job seekers’ sincerity, and these signs took
time to emerge, which the waiting game allowed.
Kevin Allard’s and George Biggs’ experiences are illustrative.
Because Kevin perceived that most job seekers in his community were
not work-ready—the overwhelming majority had spent a portion of
their adolescence and most of their adult years working in the informal
(and illegal) economy—the 32-year-old custodian ignored almost every
job seekers’ request for help. His only exceptions were for those who
pursued the job-matching process, and his assistance in it, aggressively
and persistently. This would constitute evidence that they were serious
about working. Below Kevin describes the multistage process by which
he sorts risky from safe job seekers.
I just tell them straight up. I be like, ‘‘You ain’t ready.’’ It depends on
what they say after that, to let me know if they really interested or not.
People just be saying it. ‘‘Is they hiring?’’ Yeah, you got to go to work
tomorrow and you’re not going to be ready to drop [the life] and go. So
I just tell them straight up, ‘‘You ain’t ready to work.’’ At that point they
can’t say nothing that is going to make me really believe them, because
the gift of gab is the ruler of the streets. If I say, ‘‘You ain’t ready,’’ no
matter what the outcome come out, I ain’t going to really take it [that they
are] trying to work. [But] if every time I see them they keep on asking me,
‘‘What’s up with that job,’’ then the next stage with me would be to give
them a printout or something to see if they’re going to go on the internet
and do that. And then if they handle that and they say, ‘‘Hey man, I ﬁlled
out the application. What has happened with it?,’’ I may try to give them
a number or something that they can call to try and see what’s going on
with their application or something like that. They are going to have to
really act like they’re interested.
These screening practices, however, were not always very eﬀective at
sorting risky from safe job seekers. Too often job seekers performed
sincerity in ways that jobholders expected serious job seekers would,
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but after securing employment, they would behave unprofessionally,
which not infrequently led to referrals’ dismissal or to quitting, often
without notice. In the recent past, for instance, George had been burned
by two referrals. In one instance, he proactively helped an old friend,
Ellis. George and Ellis had known each other since the ﬁfth grade and
for almost 20 years they sold drugs together. When Ellis approached
George for help getting a job at CPSE, George did not hesitate. Ellis
performed sincerity by begging for help, and so George ‘‘felt in [his]
heart’’ that Ellis really wanted to work. Still, Ellis was ﬁred after
6 months on the job. During his shift, he would disappear for long
stretches. It turns out that he had not given up their old vocation
after all—Ellis was selling drugs to members of the CPSE community.
George’s screening approach had failed to identify Ellis as high risk, and
so he fretted over how, with greater care, he could have and should have
screened Ellis. Both of George’s recent failed matches caused him to
question his own ability to discern the sincere from the ‘‘jivers’’ and
these doubts lay behind his refusal to assist others who approached him
thereafter. After his two recent failed attempts, George had decided
against helping over 10 people. About the most recently rejected job
seeker, a friend who had spent a considerable amount of time ‘‘in the
life,’’ George explained, ‘‘Now he wants to change. I heard that lie so
many times, I wouldn’t bite for that no more, okay? You got to get
some new bait. I’m not biting on, ‘I’m ready to change’.’’ Although
George promised this job seeker that he would try to help, he never
did, fearful that he would get burned again. He recounts his thinking,
Maybe I start grouping everybody in the same group, which is a bad
thing, you know. He’s always hustling these drug dealers, and he never
worked out. You doing the same thing he did. You ain’t going to work
out either. I ain’t wasting my time. I’m tired of you guys, man, lying to
me. You playing me like a sucker like you played the people who buy
these drugs from you, see, and I ain’t that sucker, okay, friends or not.
But this new state of aﬀairs—statistically discriminating against those
who approached him for support—only deepened his sense of disillu-
sionment. He exclaimed, ‘‘I hate that because maybe they would have
worked out. See, it’s crazy, because you help somebody; it don’t work
out. Then the person you don’t help would have worked out, maybe.
You don’t know.’’ Here on full display is not only George’s desire to
help others who really want to work but also his sense of defeat about
his inability to determine who the sincere job seekers are and his
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frustration about the regrettable consequences of his inability to do
so—he now shies away from this process altogether, and as a result
he frets that worthy job candidates have lost good opportunities.
Thus, the failure of their screening practices to eﬀectively sort safe
from risky job seekers has fed defensive individualists’ sense that pro-
viding job-matching support was inherently risky and so should be
engaged with extreme caution.
Particularism
Particularism, which 22% of jobholders espoused, combines need as the
primary criterion, a low-moderate degree of risk of job-matching failure
and screening practices that emerge organically. Particularists were dis-
proportionately immigrant Latino and Asian and employed as custodial
workers. Whereas 25% of CPSE respondents were Latino and 9% were
Asian, 72% and 19% of particularists were Latino and Asian, respect-
ively.7 Further, custodians were 34% of the CPSE sample, but they were
66% of particularists (see Table 3). As with defensive individualists, par-
ticularists were also wary about engaging in the job-matching process, but
their perception of risk was much more muted. They were well aware that
matches could go badly, but the possibilities they imagined did not rise to
the level of probability typically expressed by defensive individualists.
For the most part, they had reason to believe that the majority in their
network of relations—people just like themselves—were committed to
work because they needed to work; with few other viable options to
make ends meet both within and outside of the formal economy, work,
and speciﬁcally low-wage, dead-end jobs, was all there was.
Need: The motivating force. When particularists made decisions about
making referrals, need, not want, was one of the primary factors they
considered. Need was referenced to explain who they helped and why
they helped the way they did. In contrast to defensive individualists,
particularists theorized that need suﬃced to motivate job seekers to
search proactively and also to act responsibly once they secured a job.
Their reasoning was clear: in a context where few legitimate paths to
material resources existed besides work, and where work options were
themselves signiﬁcantly circumscribed by human capital deﬁciencies and
documentation status, material need produced ﬁdelity to work, because
it was principally through work that one garnered the resources needed
to feed, clothe, and shelter oneself and one’s dependents. In other
words, need produced disciplined workers—dependable, obedient,
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and self-controlled—and so focusing eﬀorts on those in need made
engagement in the job-matching process less risky. Comments to this
eﬀect were common. When asked what he considers when deciding
whether to recommend someone, Joseph Ramos implicated need’s moti-
vating force in his response: ‘‘If they’re responsible, if they’re married,
you know that he need the job. Then you kind of leaning towards that
way because you know he’s going to be responsible. He’s got a family.’’
Thirty-nine-year-old Gustavo Salazar made a similar comment when
asked what type of person he would be willing to support through the
process: ‘‘Someone that would be really responsible, mostly. And also
let’s say if he has a family, I would refer him the most, because some-
times when they are singles, they’re by themselves, they don’t really take
the job really serious.’’ Thus, when approached for help by a friend
from soccer league, Gustavo gave the job seeker strategic advice and
allowed him to use his name as a reference. He did so because ‘‘as I saw
him, he was kind of a good guy. He didn’t drink, he didn’t smoke, and
he had a family. He had a wife and two kids.’’ With family obligations,
Gustavo here again indicates that job seekers could be counted on to act
responsibly. Interestingly, whereas defensive individualists focused their
eﬀorts on job seekers who lived to work, particularists focused on job
seekers who worked to live.
Risk and constraint. Particularists focused on job seekers’ needs because
they felt doing so allowed them to accurately assess the level of risk they
would face. The greater the perceived need, especially material needs
associated with fulﬁlling family obligations, the lower the sense of risk,
as these jobholders could hardly imagine adults with familial responsi-
bilities forsaking those who relied on them. One was compelled to work,
and to work hard, to support the survival of family members; few alter-
natives to this existed. And so the risk of making failed matches was
lower than it would have been had they not felt structurally constrained
and culturally obligated. This is the sentiment shared by Jose Mendoza,
an immigrant from El Salvador who worked as a custodian for 11 years:
Like I told you before, when we come here, for example, from places like
Central America, we come with the need to work and we have people
back in our countries, so people work harder. Like what I was telling you
before, they are not going to put up a big stink about what you make
them do. But I’m going to be honest with you. I don’t know, these are
things that are diﬃcult to say, and I don’t know if I should say them, but
the majority of people that I know who were born here, that are people of
20 Work and Occupations 0(0)
 at UNIV CALIFORNIA BERKELEY LIB on November 5, 2016wox.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
color, they have, I mean, I will tell you. They know a lot about their
rights, and, I mean, it is really diﬃcult to get them to work, and the oﬃces
have more problems with them. And since we don’t know, they would tell
us, you have to do this ﬂoor, and you have to strip it and all of that. But
sometimes we don’t have the power or courage to confront them and say,
‘‘You know what? That is not my job and I don’t have to do it. Someone
else needs to come and do that or you need to pay me overtime.’’
Here Jose highlights the motivating force that family-related need has
on his in-groups’ commitment to work. But by contrasting the perceived
experiences of Central Americans with those of African Americans
(these are the people of color he references), Jose also brings into
sharp relief how, relative to the circumstances of the latter, the limited
options available to the former (perceived and real) force them to work
hard to make ends meet and makes them vulnerable to exploitation
when they do. For these reasons, too, particularists’ were less likely to
perceive prior experiences as riven with disappointment and betrayal. If
members of their networks had to work because they had few other
viable options, there was diminished need to worry about failed matches
that resulted from job seekers’ unprofessional behaviors. Data bear this
out—relatively few particularists complained about job seekers who did
not following through (6%). While half of defensive individualists
reported having been burned in the past, just 28% of particularists had.
A heightened sense of risk, however, was associated with two types of
job seekers. For both types, particularists wondered about the extent to
which job seekers needed the jobs they had to oﬀer. One type—singles, as
Gustavo called them—was deemed riskier because they did not yet have
familial obligations to motivate better, more responsible work behavior.
Because the provider role helped to ensure ﬁdelity to work in the context
of few other options, particularists preferred to help married job seekers
and those with dependents. Lacking such attachments, singles were per-
ceived to be far less motivated and so particularists were disinclined to
help them. About singles, Gustavo complained,
Sometimes they just want to get the job, get some money, and then get
another job or just spend their money. Or when they get their check, they
go out, they spend all the money, [and] they get drunk too much.
Gustavo’s comment indicates that when the motivating force to work
that familial obligations engender is lacking, particularists deemed sin-
gles too risky to help.
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The second type of job seeker who caused particularists’ concern
was those with skill sets that qualiﬁed them for better than entry-level
positions. Particularists typically only had information about and
inﬂuence over entry-level positions at CPSE, which blue-collar
respondents routinely described as equivalent to the types of jobs
oﬀered in the low-level service sector, such as fast-food restaurants,
but with superior pay and working conditions. Because these positions
were relatively attractive to job seekers who would qualify for no
better than entry-level work, particularists reasoned that, lacking
opportunities to do better, such job seekers would presumably act
responsibly and thus constitute low risk. Indeed, Michelle Mercado
intimates this when asked how she decides if she will recommend
someone. The 55-year-old food service worker employed at CPSE
for 24 years stated,
I strongly encourage those who I know really don’t have no skills or who
are uneducated, who [don’t] have real high education, or who I know
probably couldn’t go further because maybe their English or whatever,
I encourage them to apply because I know that the money that they
make here is better money than you would work at McDonald’s or any-
body else.
Similarly, 59-year-old Alfred Seguro identiﬁed need as one of the most
important criteria when deciding to help, with particular attention to
those in need of jobs that will enable them to better support their
families. Indeed, for these workers, the custodian proactively recruits.
When asked about the opportunities he has recently had to help, he
explained,
Probably a dozen times. Like the cleaning lady at my health club. I’ve
seen her there for a couple of years, and then one day I started talking to
her and I said how long have you been doing this, da-da-da. Because
I know for a fact that we have much more beneﬁts and she’s basically
doing the same thing we’re doing. I said—hey, why don’t you go up there
and apply; you should do that. A few people like that, that I’ve seen
around that I know from whatever I’m doing during my day. And I’ll
tell them. So people like that. I see them and I know them even just a little
bit and I’ll tell them—hey, why don’t you go up here and apply?
These jobholders perceived greater risk, however, when dealing with
semiskilled and skilled job seekers. Because they had a modicum of
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marketable skills to oﬀer—greater levels of education, English ﬂuency,
and hard skills in the trades, for instance—semiskilled workers also had
a greater range of options available to them. Entry-level work repre-
sented one set of possibilities, but their skill set opened up other avenues
for employment as well, many of which paid more than positions
at CPSE fetched. Thus, although lesser skilled workers would likely
appreciate blue-collar CPSE jobs because they oﬀered better compen-
sation than jobs they could otherwise secure, semiskilled and skilled
workers would not be so impressed. Particularists reported that after
securing employment at CPSE, the latter would often complain that
they were not paid enough for the work required of them, and they
were also frustrated by the limited paths for promotion. They reckoned
they could do better elsewhere and this made them unreliable and
disaﬀected.
Screening organically. Determining need occurred more organically among
particularists than determining want did among defensive individualists.
Particularists simply drew from the bank of knowledge that they had
already gathered about job seekers, the product of ﬁrst- and second-
hand observations. Job seekers were, by and large, relatives and close
friends, but acquaintances, typically former coworkers searching for
alternative work arrangements, sought help as well. About these job
seekers, jobholders already had a vast amount of information from
which to determine need. They knew marital status, number of depend-
ent children, and extrafamilial commitments; they knew whether job
seekers were struggling to pay the rent or the mortgage, and they
knew why; they knew when a single mother needed extra income to
support her children after a recent marital disruption. This was infor-
mation that passed easily through their network of relations, and they
used this information to determine need and to assess risk. Because
particularists did not perceive a similar level or type of risk, they did
not adopt strategies similar to those deployed by defensive individual-
ists, and they responded diﬀerently than defensive individualists likely
would have under similar circumstances.
Matchmakers
Matchmaking, the approach favored by 37% of jobholders, combines
ﬁt as the primary criterion, a relatively moderate sense of risk of
job-matching failure, and both organic and inorganic screening prac-
tices. Matchmakers were disproportionately White and worked as
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administrative staﬀ. Whereas just 13% of respondents in this study were
White, 29% of matchmakers were; 44% were Black, a ﬁgure close to
their representation in the CPSE sample. Further, whereas administra-
tive staﬀ were 28% of the CPSE sample, they were 65% of match-
makers. As with particularists, matchmakers perceived themselves to
be embedded in networks and neighborhoods with very strong labor
market attachments. But unlike particularists, whose ties were primarily
to low-wage and low-skilled workers, matchmakers’ networks were
composed of highly educated individuals working in a diverse range
of occupations, most especially as professionals. Importantly, given
their networks’ strong attachments to the labor market, matchmakers
rarely wondered about the desire that their job-seeking networks had to
work; about this they had no concerns. They did wonder, however,
whether their job-seeking relations had what it took to work hard and
to commit. As a baseline requirement, matchmakers only considered
helping job seekers who had the requisite hard and soft skills to perform
tasks on the job competently; in jobs that required higher levels of
education and training, this mattered a great deal. But ﬁt was not
solely a matter of one’s ability to do the work competently. Fit was
associated with two additional layers of meaning: personal fulﬁllment
and emotional intelligence and maturity.
Fit as personal fulfillment, as passion. Over two thirds of matchmakers
associated ﬁt with having interest in the work and saw this as key to
being motivated. Matchmakers operated under a simple premise: People
perform well at and commit to jobs that they enjoy doing. ‘‘You must
like what you do in order to be good at it. You need to like it,’’
explained 50-year-old Bettina Bullock, a black supervisor of food ser-
vice workers. Matchmakers argued that deep and enduring commit-
ments to work resulted from doing work, speciﬁc jobs, that aligned
with one’s interests or passions. Because they primarily attributed
work performance to job seekers’ passion for or interest in the speciﬁc
job in question, passion or deep interest became a primary criterion that
matchmakers used to determine whether and how they would help.
Where passion seemed lacking, matchmakers would question job see-
kers’ seriousness, with implications for the extent and nature of help
they would be willing to provide. Indeed, matchmakers declined or were
reluctant to help those for whom a passion for the work in question was
absent, even if job seekers exhibited a clear desire to work generally or
were otherwise capable of doing the work. Equating ﬁt with love,
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Richard Ross suggests as much when he states,
If you need a job and you’re looking for anything, I can recommend you.
But if you need a job and you’re looking for something speciﬁc and that
something speciﬁc comes up, then I would really recommend you and
I would really pull your coattail.
This suggests a much more proactive approach to providing job-match-
ing help. But others, like Carol Montgomery, were unequivocal—help
would not be forthcoming unless job seekers clearly articulated speciﬁc
interests.
Fit as emotional intelligence and maturity. Two thirds of matchmakers also
associated being good, responsible, and reliable workers with emotional
intelligence, maturity, and ﬂexibility. Idealized were job seekers who
were respectful or tolerant of diﬀerences, fair, friendly and approach-
able, and easygoing but energetic. Desired as well were those who got
along well with others, worked well on teams, and listened. Job seekers
who were committed to their own personal and professional growth
were also viewed quite favorably. Emotional intelligence, maturity,
and ﬂexibility, seen as the underpinnings of job seekers’ interpersonal
skill set and style, were important not so much because they aﬀected
whether or how well referrals might get their own tasks done. In fact,
a number of matchmakers highlighting the central importance of
these attributes were clear in distinguishing this from referrals’ ability
to do the work. Instead, these attributes mattered to matchmakers
because of how they might aﬀect the work environment. Those
who lacked emotional intelligence, maturity, and ﬂexibility had the
potential to signiﬁcantly disrupt work processes by alienating cowor-
kers, harming relationships, and generally making work an unpleasant
place to be. Those with these attributes, however, were often described
as beacons of light and goodness. Because they primarily attributed
work performance to job seekers’ emotional intelligence, maturity,
and ﬂexibility, these attributes became a primary criterion that many
matchmakers used to determine whether they would help and how they
might do so.
Determining fit. To determine ﬁt, whether for passion or emotional
intelligence, maturity, and ﬂexibility, matchmakers primarily relied on
ﬁrsthand knowledge gained from personal interactions with potential
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job seekers as well as observations of job seekers in various contexts.
Such interactions and observations, in some cases, directly relevant to
work-related issues, in other cases much less so, gave matchmakers a
sense of the type of work in which job seekers might excel, but also the
type of work environment for which their personalities might be best
suited. So, for instance, to explain how he determined whether job
seekers had the attributes he thought important, Jason Price highlighted
the importance of ﬁrsthand knowledge, stating,
Because I usually would know the person well enough to determine that.
I can really get a good sense or a good read of if they’re just looking for a
job just to do or that’s something that really ﬁts them and their character.
It’s almost like matchmaking.
And according to Carol Montgomery, ﬁrsthand knowledge was crucial
to making a determination of job seekers’ ﬁt. According to Carol,
If you have known them for any amount of time—you know what they
did before, you know how they went to work, if they were a hard worker,
if they were conscientious, if they were willing to learn, if they were very
social. You know, where they get along with people. All those things play
[a role]. Like if you make plans with this person regularly and they always
cancel or ﬂake or can’t pull it together. Or they tell you stories about how
they behaved at their work, which just is like appalling and inappropriate.
How things work out for them normally. If you know that person well
enough you . . . if you don’t know them well enough, then of course it
would be a 50-50 chance, right?
Thus, matchmakers called forth memories of their experiences with their
job-seeking friends, relatives, and acquaintances that would enable them
to more accurately assess the risks they faced. Although certainly not
always the case, a history of positive interactions went a long way
toward engendering conﬁdence in job seekers’ abilities, as Evelyn
Kurt indicates about a job seeker who approached her for assistance.
She had always been a pretty good friend to me in the past. I mean, we
weren’t super-close, but I had always found her to be very kind and
generous. When I worked for her she invited me over to her home a
number of times. And she was a good worker. Very hardworking. Very
smart. Very talented.
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And when asked how he determined a potential referral would be a
good match, Karl Castle noted his observations of the subject in mul-
tiple contexts. ‘‘Because I watched him as a parent. I watched him as a
musician. How he handled situations in the past when I had some jobs
that I did, and he helped me out. And I was like, ‘Okay’.’’ Without these
interactions and observations, matchmakers had an obscured sense of
the risks of adverse selection they faced, or, as Carol suggests in her
statement mentioned earlier, they assumed a much higher risk of job-
matching failure and so their willingness to help in a way that might
implicate them in the process was considerably diminished. Indeed, this
is what lay behind Linda Ortiz’s emphatic response, ‘‘If it’s somebody
that I just met, I wouldn’t do it.’’ This logic is also implicated in Casey
Reid’s remark, ‘‘. . .I’m not going to make a recommendation unless I’ve
probably had some interaction with the person and gotten an idea of
who they are as a person and their work ethic.’’ Knowledge of job
seekers from a trusted source, however, could eﬀectively substitute for
knowing job seekers ﬁrsthand.
Passion-focused matchmakers, in particular, also took time out, over
coﬀee or lunch, to establish ﬁt by discussing the job and its requirements
with job seekers so that the latter could be certain of their interest in and
excitement about the work required. These matchmakers also spent time
reviewing job seekers re´sume´s. Passion for speciﬁc types of work, they
argued, should be reﬂected in job seekers’ list of prior employment
experiences. If matchmakers found inconsistencies, they were reluctant
to move forward. This was how Richard Ross described his recent
experience with a job seeker:
He was looking for anything. It was one of those types of situations
where, ‘‘I don’t really care what it is; I’ll do it.’’ And I was like, ‘‘Well,
we don’t really have anything like that. I need something speciﬁc that you
can do, that I can promote you for and say, ‘Hey, this guy is really good
at this.’ So I tell him, ‘Send me a re´sume´’.’’ I look over their re´sume´ and
none of what they were doing or had done had anything to do with what
he really wanted to do or what this job was. So I was like, ‘‘Okay, it’s
almost no point.’’
Given the questionable ﬁt, Richard dissuaded his friend from applying
for the position. His close attention to his friend’s re´sume´ enabled him
to determine this.
When discussing how they determined ﬁt, notably absent from
matchmakers’ descriptions were the methods that defensive
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individualists relied on heavily to separate the wheat from the chaﬀ. No
matchmaker described behaving in ways indicative of statistical discrim-
ination, for instance; they did not automatically exclude from consid-
eration of individuals whose social identities aligned them with a
category of people who matchmakers perceived to be risky bets. This
makes sense. Among defensive individualists, statistical discrimination
was noted speciﬁcally among those who lost conﬁdence in their ability
to distinguish between good and bad candidates; these were contacts
who had been burned at least twice before. Few matchmakers reported
having been burned at all, and among those who had been burned, none
reported having been burned more than once. Without a clear pattern of
such failures, they had little reason to question, at least not for very
long, their own ability to accurately assess the risks they faced. No
matchmaker described playing a waiting game either, creating opportu-
nities to gather more information that would help them to assess the
risks they faced. This also makes sense. Defensive individualists used the
waiting game to screen out job seekers who lacked sincerity about their
desires to work and so who likely would not follow through. Those who
were insincere, it was believed, would eventually reveal themselves by
passively engaging the job search process. Relatively few matchmakers,
however, had problems with job seekers who failed to follow through.
Furthermore, the issues about which they were concerned could not be
reasonably addressed by waiting job seekers out.
Patterns of Job-Matching Assistance
Cultural logics would be relatively unimportant if they were not asso-
ciated with distinct patterns of job-matching assistance (see Table 5).
Defensive individualists’ patterns are distinct in several ways. First, on
average, they help a greater number of job seekers. This seems counter-
intuitive, given their wariness about the process, but it actually makes
sense. Many defensive individualists report being inundated with
requests for help by members of their community. As shown in
Table 5, defensive individualists estimated that in the past year they
were approached by a median of 4.6 job seekers and a mean of 13.5,
a ﬁgure driven up by roughly 40% of defensive individualists who
reported being approached by one to two job seekers every month
or every week. But because defensive individualists often doubted job
seekers’ sincerity, they limited the help they provided to basic informa-
tion—they informed job seekers about the status of CPSE’s hiring and
encouraged them to visit the website for more information. They helped
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without really helping, as they themselves reported. Consistent with this,
a higher percentage of defensive individualists only provided basic infor-
mation to job seekers—25% versus 9% and 7% of particularists and
matchmakers, respectively. Further, a lower percentage oﬀered strategic
help, acted as a reference, and talked to hiring personnel on behalf of
their job-seeking relation. Thus, relative to particularists and match-
makers, the help that defensive individualists provided was more passive
in nature, a likely reﬂection of their desire to remain somewhat distant
from the process, given the level of risk they perceived that they faced.
Not surprisingly, when compared with particularists and match-
makers, a higher percentage of defensive individualists also decided
against helping those they knew to be in the market for a new
job—26% and 42% versus 61%, respectively—and when they did
reject, they rejected a greater number of job seekers—3.7 versus 1.7
and 2.1, respectively. But even those who reported that no one had
approached them recently could list a number of people they helped
Table 5. Patterns of Helping by Logics of Assistance (N¼ 146).
Defensive
individualists Particularists Matchmakers
Multiple
logics
Maximum number of
job seekers approaching
jobholders in
the past year
(median/mean)
4.6/13.5 4.3/13.2 2.3/7.0 2.2/2.8
% Helping recently 87 89 73 82
Average number helped 4.1 3.0 2.3 2.4
How jobholders helped: % Offering . . .
Basic information
(info only)
91 (25) 88 (9) 86 (7) 88 (27)
Strategic advice 35 36 45 38
Acted as reference 15 36 17 25
Talked to boss 47 68 55 13
% Rejecting recently 61 26 42 46
Number rejected 3.7 1.7 2.1 1.6
Approached by none 7.0 2.0 0 0
Inundated (12 or
more in past year)
4.0 1.3 2.2 3.0
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and rejected. On average, defensive individualists who had not been
approached actually helped 3.7 job seekers and declined to assist 7. It
becomes clear here that one’s opportunity to help or reject was not
limited to the pool of job seekers actively seeking their aid.
Particularists also described themselves as inundated with requests
for job-seeking help, reporting numbers similar to those reported by
defensive individualists (see Table 5). But because they were less con-
cerned than defensive individualists about putting their names on the
line for the job seekers in their networks of relations, we contend that
they were more proactive in their eﬀorts to help. A higher percentage
both acted as references and talked to hiring personnel on job seekers’
behalf. In addition, proportionately fewer particularists rejected
job seekers and those who did rejected fewer, on average, than did
defensive individualists. Indeed, among particularists and defensive
individualists who had been inundated with requests for help, particu-
larists declined to assist fewer on average—1.3 (n¼ 4) versus 4.0 (n¼ 9).
These averages are based on the experiences of relatively few respond-
ents, but they suggest that diﬀerences between particularists and defen-
sive individualists are not likely attributable to the number of job
seekers who approached them or the extent of opportunities they had
to help.8
Comparatively speaking, matchmakers were not overwhelmed with
requests for job-matching help. Over the past year, they were
approached by a median of 2.3 and a mean of 7 job seekers. To some
extent this accounts . . . for why matchmakers helped fewer job seekers
than defensive individualists and particularists. Only 73% of match-
makers reported recently helping when they had job vacancy informa-
tion, compared with 87% and 89% of defensive individualists and
particularists, respectively. Those who did not help attributed this to
the fact that most in their networks were engaged in very diﬀerent types
of occupational pursuits. But when matchmakers did help, they
appeared most distinct in terms of providing strategic advice. Not sur-
prisingly, a higher percentage counseled job seekers about their re´sume´s,
suggesting ways that job seekers might better describe themselves and
their prior experiences so as to emphasize ﬁt. A signiﬁcant minority of
matchmakers also recently rejected job seekers—an average of 2.1 was
turned away, a ﬁgure similar to the number they helped. Also, despite
being approached by many fewer job seekers than particularists, match-
makers rejected slightly more. Here again, the numbers helped and
rejected cannot be solely attributed to the volume of job seekers seeking
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aid, as matchmakers were approached by far fewer job seekers than
were particularists.
That jobholders appear more likely to help in ways similar to how
they perceived they were helped also suggests that cultural logics and
related accounts are informed by their own experiences ﬁnding work.9
As reported in Table 6, 75% of jobholders in the sample were job
matched by a personal contact. Among those so matched, 56% reported
receiving basic information, 45% received strategic advice, and 18%
and 23% had someone who acted as a reference or talked to hiring
personnel on their behalf, respectively. Although there were some note-
worthy diﬀerences across logics of assistance, more important to note is
that in general, jobholders were more likely to help in ways that they
perceived they had been helped (ﬁgures not shown).
Discussion and Conclusion
Drawing from a unique dataset based on in-depth, semistructured inter-
views with a nonrandom sample of 146 ethnoracially diverse, blue- and
white-collar workers at one large public sector employer, we uncovered
three distinct logics of job-matching assistance, each developed within
speciﬁc cultural and structural contexts. These cultural logics had con-
sequences, as jobholders’ patterns of job-matching assistance diﬀered in
noteworthy ways. Defensive individualists helped scores of job seekers,
but compared with particularists and matchmakers, their eﬀorts were
more passive and they rejected as many as they helped. Particularists
Table 6. How Jobholders Found Work at CPSE (N¼ 146).
Defensive
individualists Particularists Matchmakers
Combined
logics Total
Personal contact 80.0 87.1 62.3 54.5 75.0
How personal contacts helped
Basic information 53.1 61.5 60.0 20.0 56.1
Strategic
information
65.6 32.0 34.5 60.0 44.8
Reference 18.8 8.0 20.7 20.0 17.7
Talked to boss 21.9 30.8 20.7 20.0 22.7
Encouragement 6.3 4.0 13.3 20.0 8.2
Note. CPSE¼Central Public Sector Enterprise.
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helped more proactively—they were more inclined to act as a reference
and to talk to employers on job seekers’ behalf—and they rejected few.
Matchmakers, who rejected as many as they helped, were concerned
with job seekers’ ﬁt and so more inclined to provide strategic advice,
especially about job seekers’ resumes.
Jobholders’ patterns of helping are also of consequence, as diﬀerent
methods of assistance yield diﬀerent results. Previous research indicates
that contacts’ involvement in the hiring process improves the quality of
applicant pools, presumably because such contacts screen out unsuit-
able job seekers and coach suitable ones on how to write appropriate
resumes (Fernandez & Weinberg, 1997; Fernandez et al., 2000).
Contacts also inform job seekers about the least competitive times to
apply, which improves referrals’ chances of getting interviews over non-
referral competitors (Fernandez & Weinberg, 1997). Referrals are also
more likely to be hired when personal contacts vouch for the applicants
they refer (see also Granovetter, 1974, 1995; Neckerman & Fernandez,
2003; Newman & Lennon, 1995). There is little evidence, however, that
job seekers beneﬁt much, if at all, from receiving basic information.
According to Granovetter (1974/1995), basic information aﬀords job
seekers no clear advantage in the matching process. It is the equivalent
of searching through formal means, as job seekers are no more likely to
know about possible openings than any other job seeker, they are not
made privy to any insights that might advantage them in the process,
and no one is speaking to hiring personnel on their behalf. What this
suggests is that particularists, who have a greater tendency to put their
names on the line, and matchmakers, who appear more likely to oﬀer
strategic advice, are more likely to give their referrals advantages during
the matching process. Defensive individualists, on the other hand, who
appear less inclined to oﬀer these forms of assistance and who have a
greater tendency to provide basic information only, are doing compara-
tively little to advantage their job-seeking relations during this process.
This may explain why the overwhelming majority of low-income Blacks
search for work through networks but relatively few actually get
matched to jobs through these informal channels, and among those
who do, most receive passive assistance—they are merely informed
about the positions for which they might apply (Elliot & Sims, 2001;
Falcon & Melendez, 2001; Green, Tigges, & Diaz, 1999; Smith, 2000).
As we have suggested, however, this may be by design, as many poten-
tial job contacts fear the shame and embarrassment that might come
with initiating failed matches. Clearly, more research is needed to inves-
tigate these relationships further, but the implication of our ﬁndings is
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that by shaping whether and how job contacts engage in the matching
process, cultural logics indirectly aﬀect job seekers’ odds of job-ﬁnding
success.
It is possible, however, that the distinct logics that we have revealed
have their roots in the very institution in which each of these jobholders
are embedded—CPSE—the product of CPSE’s informal and formal
policies and practices (see Sharone, 2013, 2014). Unfortunately, we do
not have the data to properly tease out the eﬀects of CPSE’s diﬀerent
policies and practices on the logics that jobholders embrace and related
patterns of job-matching assistance they report. The 146 food service
workers, custodians, and administrative staﬀ were distributed across
over one dozen diﬀerent units and work groups, each with their own
set of supervisors, managers, and general managers, and so each with
potentially distinct approaches to recruitment, screening, and hiring.
But what data we do have discount CPSE’s central role. Because
every worker reported that they knew CPSE was hiring, and for what
position, because of biweekly announcements posted in workers’
common areas or e-mailed directly to workers, we are reasonably con-
ﬁdent that there are no formal or informal practices that systematically
advantaged (or disadvantaged) some job holders during the process of
network recruitment that would contribute signiﬁcantly to the creation
of the distinct logics we report.
Nor were there any tangible or material beneﬁts or costs associated
with initiating a failed match that might produce distinct CPSE-
generated logics and related patterns of assistance. When asked to
speak to the actual beneﬁts they gained from helping, the overwhelming
majority said they experienced no beneﬁt at all, a ﬁnding consistent
across logics.10 The same was true of the actual costs borne for initiating
failed matches; the overwhelming majority who had such experiences
reported no negative consequences, with no apparent diﬀerences by
logics of assistance. Given that, across the board, poor matches were
scarcely penalized and good matches went largely unrewarded by the
institution, and given that perceptions of costs and beneﬁts diﬀered
signiﬁcantly from the actual beneﬁts and costs jobholders experienced,
it is unclear how in this context formal and informal institutional prac-
tices and policies might have informed diﬀerences in jobholders’ under-
standings of the risks and costs they faced, and, in the process, shaped
their patterns of helping and rejecting.
But our ﬁndings must be placed in context. We interviewed an eth-
noracially diverse sample of workers from one large, public sector
employer after the Great Recession had begun. For the most part,
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CPSE supervisors and general managers generally encouraged workers,
as a group, to recruit from their network of relations, and as previous
research indicates (Fernandez & Weinberg, 1997; Fernandez et al., 2000;
but see Fernandez & Fernandez-Mateo, 2006), referrals appeared to
have a distinct advantage. Interviews with workers, but also with super-
visors and general managers, indicated as much. Had the organization
generally discouraged referrals or did less to incentivize referral-making
behavior, however, it is not clear that the same logics of assistance
would have been operative, since the conditions informing these logics
would be diﬀerent. Without opportunities to help, the perception of
risks associated with these opportunities would also decline. Similarly,
if CPSE were an organization with high rates of turnover, it is likely that
diﬀerent logics would have emerged. CPSE is widely known in the local
area to oﬀer decent jobs with great beneﬁts, including good retirement
packages. Because of this reputation, turnover among career workers is
fairly low. Once people are hired at CPSE, they tend to stay, even if they
change positions within the organization. In a context where few are
expected to last for long, however, there is little reason to fear risk of
failure. More research is needed to clarify how organizational structures
inform the logics of job-matching assistance that job contacts construct
and that shape their behaviors during the job-matching process.
Importantly, these logics are also strongly informed by the accounts
that job contacts construct about the extent and nature of risk that
their job-seeking relations pose to them, accounts that emerge as
much outside of the work realm as within it (Smith, 2007). It is from
these contexts combined that cultural logics emerge, informing where,
how much, and to whom job information and inﬂuence ﬂows.
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Notes
1. To protect respondents’ identities, we use pseudonyms for all names asso-
ciated with the institution and respondents, and some details about their
backgrounds and work roles have been altered.
2. For every worker they helped to recruit, respondents were paid $10.
3. Only for executive positions does the hiring process differ from what we have
outlined here.
4. In 19 of 32 cases, the final codes were consistent with the first author’s initial
determination; in nine cases, the final codes were consistent with the second
author’s initial determination; and in four cases, we decided on a code that
differed from both of our initial determinations.
5. Eleven jobholders (7.5%) could not be easily categorized in one of these three
distinct groups. Instead, some deployed multiple cultural logics for different
segments of their network of relations, which indicates that cultural logics of
assistance are informed in part by the composition of their network of rela-
tions, broadly defined, through which accounts are constructed to explain the
extent and nature of their labor market attachments. Some deployed differ-
ent logics at different periods, consistent with their changing personal and
professional conception of self. This indicates that cultural logics of assist-
ance are also informed by jobholders’ shifting positions in social structure.
Five percent of jobholders could not be categorized at all due to the incom-
prehensibility of their responses to relevant questions.
6. To gather data about respondents’ close ties, name generators are typically
deployed (Burt, 1984; Marsden, 1987). Our respondents were asked to
provide a list of people with whom they discussed important matters, with
follow-up questions about the following: discussion partners’ gender, race
or ethnicity, highest level of education completed, work status, work
occupation, work industry, and welfare receipt. To determine the nature
of the relationship between respondents and their discussion partners,
we also inquired about how they were related and the frequency of their
contact.
7. About 71% of Latino respondents and 85% of Asian respondents were for-
eign born.
8. Of note is that for both defensive individualists and particularists, estimates
of the number who approached them in the prior year far exceed the sum
total of individuals they reported to have helped and rejected. What we sus-
pect, but cannot confirm, is that when asked to recall specific instances,
inundated jobholders could only remember well instances in the past year
that were most recent or that stood out for some reason. Uneventful experi-
ences, especially those more distant, were likely a blur and so did not become
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a part of the record of assists and rejections, even if they were a part of
general estimates of job seekers with whom they had come into contact.
9. Importantly how jobholders were actually helped in finding work probably
differs for many from how they think they were helped through the process.
Smith (2005, 2007, 2010) has shown that in an effort to avoid conflict and
save face, it was not unusual for her jobholders to mislead their job-seeking
relations about the nature of assistance they have provided; they indicated
that they had provided far more assistance than they offered. It is also quite
likely that many receive more help than they realize. Several jobholders
in this sample reported receiving less help than their referrers—CPSE
jobholders also interviewed for this study—reported providing.
10. Although CPSE once had a practice of offering bonuses to current employ-
ees who initiated successful job matches, as workers with longer tenures on
the job lamented, that practice had ended in the late 1990s. Bonuses were no
longer offered to incentivize network recruitment.
References
Burt, R. S. (1984). Network items and the general social survey. Social
Networks, 6, 293–339.
Burt, R. S. (1992). Structural holes: The social structure of competition.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Coffey, A., & Atkinson, P. (1996). Making sense of qualitative data analysis:
Complementary strategies. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Elliot, J. R., & Sims, M. (2001). Ghettos and barrios: The impact of neighbor-
hood poverty and race on job matching among blacks and latinos. Social
Problems, 48(3), 341–361.
Enfield, N. J. (2000). The theory of cultural logic: How individuals combine
social intelligence with semiotics to create and maintain cultural meaning.
Cultural Dynamics, 12(1), 35–64.
Falcon, L.M., &Melendez, E. (2001). Racial and ethnic differences in job search-
ing in urban centers. InA.O’Connor, C. Tilly&L.Bobo (Eds.),Urban inequal-
ity: Evidence from four cities. New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation.
Fernandez, R. M., Castillo, E., & Moore, P. (2000). Social capital at work:
Networks and employment at a phone center. American Journal of
Sociology, 105, 1288–1356.
Fernandez, R. M., & Fernandez-Mateo, I. (2006). Networks, race, and hiring.
American Sociological Review, 71, 42–71.
Fernandez, R. M., & Weinberg, N. (1997). Personal contacts and hiring in a
retail bank. American Sociological Review, 62, 883–902.
Fernandez, R. M. & Galperin, R. V. (2014). The causal status of social capital in
labor markets. In D. J. Brass, G. Labianca, A. Mehra, D. S. Halgin, & S. P.
Borgatti (Eds.), Contemporary Perspectives on Organizational Social
Networks (Research in the Sociology of Organizations, Volume 40) (pp.
445–462). Bingley, UK: Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
36 Work and Occupations 0(0)
 at UNIV CALIFORNIA BERKELEY LIB on November 5, 2016wox.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Granovetter, M. S. (1973). The strength of weak ties. American Journal of
Sociology, 78, 1360–1380.
Granovetter, M. S. (1983). The strength of weak ties: A network theory revis-
ited. Sociological Theory, 1, 201–233.
Granovetter, M. S. (1995). Getting a job: A study of contacts and careers
(2nd ed.). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press (Original work published
1974).
Green, G. P., Tigges, L. M., & Diaz, D. (1999). Racial and ethnic differences in
job-search strategies in Atlanta, Boston, and Los Angeles. Social Science
Quarterly, 80(2), 263–278.
Hamm, L., & McDonald, S. (2015). Helping hands: Race, neighborhood con-
text, and reluctance in providing job-finding assistance. The Sociological
Quarterly, 56, 539–557.
Holbrow, H. J. (2015). How conformity to labor market norms increases access
to job search assistance: A case study from Japan. Work and Occupations,
42(2), 135–173.
Kalleberg, A. L. (2011). Good jobs, bad jobs: The rise of polarized and precarious
employment systems in the United States, 1970s–2000s. New York, NY:
Russell Sage Foundation, American Sociological Association Rose Series
in Sociology.
Kalleberg, A. L., Reskin, B. F., & Hudson, K. (2000). Bad jobs in America:
Standard and nonstandard employment relations and job quality in the
United States. American Sociological Review, 65(2), 256–278.
Kasarda, J. D. (1995). Industrial restructuring and the changing location of jobs.
In R. Farley (Ed.), State of the union: America in the 1990s, Volume one:
Economic trends (pp. 215–267). New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation.
Kirschenman, J., & Neckerman, K. M. (1991). ‘We’d love to hire them, but. . .’:
The meaning of race for employers. In C. Jencks & P. Peterson (Eds.), The
urban underclass. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.
Lin, N. (2001). Social capital: A theory of social structure and action. Cambridge,
England: Cambridge University Press.
Lin, N., Ensel, W., & Vaughn, J. C. (1981). Social resources and strength of ties:
Structural factors in occupational status attainment. American Sociological
Review, 46(4), 393–405.
Lin, N., Lee, H. Y., & Ao, D. (2014). Contact status and finding a job:
Validation and extension. In N. Lin, Y.-C. Fu & C.-J. Jay Chen (Eds.),
Social capital and its institutional contingency: A study of the United States,
China and Taiwan (pp. 21–41). New York, NY: Routledge.
Lipshitz, R., & Strauss, O. (1997). Coping with uncertainty: A naturalistic
decision-making analysis. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision
Processes, 69(2), 149–163.
Loprest, P. J., & Zedlewski, S. R. (1999). Current and former welfare recipients:
How do they differ? Assessing the new federalism series. Washington, DC:
Urban Institute.
Smith and Young 37
 at UNIV CALIFORNIA BERKELEY LIB on November 5, 2016wox.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Marin, A. (2012). ‘Don’t mention it’: Why people don’t share job information,
when they do, and why it matters. Social Networks, 34, 181–192.
Marin, A. (2013). Who can tell? Network diversity, within-industry networks,
and opportunities to share job information. Sociological Forum, 28(2),
350–372.
Marsden, P. (1987). Core discussion networks of Americans. American
Sociological Review, 52, 122–131.
Menjivar, C. (2000). Fragmented ties: Salvadoran immigrant networks in
America. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Miles, M. B., & Huberman, A. M. (1994). Qualitative data analysis: An
expanded source-book (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Mouw, T. (2003). Social capital and finding a job: Do contacts matter?
American Sociological Review, 68(6), 868–898.
Mouw, T. (2006). Estimating the causal effect of social capital: A review of
recent research. Annual Review of Sociology, 32, 79–102.
Neckerman, K., & Fernandez, R. (2003). Keeping a job: Network hiring and
turnover in a retail bank. Research in the Sociology of Organizations, 20,
299–318.
Newman, K. S. (1999). No shame in my game: The working poor in the inner city.
New York, NY: Knopf and Russell Sage Foundation.
Newman, K. S., & Lennon, C. (1995). Finding work in the inner city: How hard
is it now? How hard will it be for AFDC recipients? (Working Paper 76).
New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation.
Paul, A. M. (2012). Differentiated social capital mobilization in the migration
decision (Working paper). Ann Arbor: University of Michigan.
Petersen, T., Saporta, I., & Seidel, M.-D. L. (2000). Offering a job: Meritocracy
and social networks. American Journal of Sociology, 106, 763–816.
Podolny, J. M. (1993). A status-based model of market competition. American
Journal of Sociology, 98, 829–872.
Podolny, J. M. (1994). Market uncertainty and the social character of economic
exchange. Administrative Science Quarterly, 39(3), 458–483.
Podolny, J. M. (2001). Networks as the pipes and prisms of the market.
American Journal of Sociology, 107(1), 33–60.
Royster, D. (2003). Race and the invisible hand: How white networks exclude
black men from blue-collar jobs. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Sharone, O. (2013). Flawed system/flawed self: Job searching and unemployment
experiences. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Sharone, O. (2014). Social capital activation and job searching: Embedding the
use of weak ties in the American institutional context. Work and
Occupations, 41(4), 409–439.
Shih, J. (2002). ‘. . .Yeah, i could hire this one, but i know it’s gonna be a
problem’: How race, nativity, and gender affect employers’ perceptions of
the manageability of job seekers. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 25(1), 99–119.
38 Work and Occupations 0(0)
 at UNIV CALIFORNIA BERKELEY LIB on November 5, 2016wox.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Smith, C. (2010). What is a person? Rethinking humanity, social life, and the
moral good from the person up. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Smith, S. S. (2000). Mobilizing social resources: Race, ethnic, and gender dif-
ferences in social capital and persisting wage inequalities. The Sociological
Quarterly, 41(4), 509–537.
Smith, S. S. (2005). ‘Don’t put my name on it’: Social capital activation and job-
finding assistance among the black urban poor. American Journal of
Sociology, 111(1), 1–57.
Smith, S. S. (2007). Lone pursuit: Distrust and defensive individualism among the
black poor. New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation.
Smith, S. S. (2010). A test of sincerity: How black and latino service workers
make decisions about making referrals. Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science, 629, 30–52.
Strauss, A. (1987). Qualitative analysis for social scientists. Cambridge, England:
Cambridge University Press.
Strauss, A., & Corbin, J. (1990). Basics of qualitative research: Grounded theory,
procedures, and techniques. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Trimble-O’Connor, L. (2013). Ask and you shall (not) receive: Social network
contacts’ provision of help during the job search. Social Networks, 35(4),
593–603.
Waldinger, R., & Lichter, M. I. (2003). How the other half works: Immigration
and the social organization of labor. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Weiss, R. S. (1994). Learning from strangers: The art and method of qualitative
studies. New York, NY: The Free Press.
Wilson, W. J. (1987). The truly disadvantaged: The inner city, the underclass, and
public policy. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Wilson, W. J. (1996). When work disappears: The world of the new urban poor.
New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf.
Author Biographies
Sandra Susan Smith is an associate professor of sociology at the
University of California, Berkeley. Her research interests lie at the inter-
section of urban poverty, joblessness, race and ethnicity, social capital
mobilization, and social networks.
Kara Alexis Young is a PhD candidate in sociology at the University of
California, Berkeley. Her areas of expertise include the sociology of
food consumption, the sociology of race and gender, social theory,
and qualitative methods. She is currently completing her dissertation,
titled, Gut Feelings: The Emotions of Food Inequality.
Smith and Young 39
 at UNIV CALIFORNIA BERKELEY LIB on November 5, 2016wox.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
